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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem area 
  
The treaty of Lisbon in 2009 reformed the old EU structure by merging the three 
pillars into just two, where the first pillar represents the policy areas now governed by 
the supranational aspect of the EU and the second being the intergovernmental 
Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon treaty aimed to provide the 
Union with a ‘legal personality’ by increasing the authority of the supranational 
aspect of the EU (EULEX, 2010). However, concerning the CFSP area there existed 
no real support of pooling sovereignty amongst the member-states and therefore the 
CFSP is still controlled by the member-states, represented in the Council, enduring 
their right to veto any proposal. Therefore, the norm of consensus reaching in 
decision-making on the foreign policy area is present and determining for the whole 
negotiation process. Several cases within the area of EU foreign policy, such as the 
war in Iraq and the Yugoslavian crisis, has shown large member-state divisions over 
what action the EU should take, and it is therefore a misconnection to assume that 
the EU states have a single view of foreign policy (McNamara, 2009). Scholars 
argue that the EU’s foreign policy has a structural problem that undermines its 
efficiency (Vimont, 2015). As McNamara (2009) points out: “In order for 27 member 
states to agree on a united foreign policy, almost all the meat will have to be taken 
off the bones of that policy in order to build a consensus”  
(Mcnamara, 2009, p.5). 
 
As it is now, even though the CFSP decision-making allows for qualified majority 
voting (QMV), any member state may block it contesting national policy reasons. 
These provisions exemplify the structural inefficiency of CFSP, member states have 
too much power to block policies they do not like. Hence, it is argued in some 
countries such as Great Britain that: ‘When we don’t agree, there is no common 
policy’ (Reynolds, 2004 cited in Thomas, 2009, p 341). Furthermore, the Lisbon 
treaty has not fundamentally changed this provisions.  
However the Lisbon treaty has, while not managing to integrate the CFSP into the 
supranational governance institutions, increased the influence of the High 
Representative in the Council and establish the European External Action Service 
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(EEAS). The High Representative provides a gateway between the 
intergovernmental CFSP area and the supranational agencies of the EU by holding a 
monitoring seat in the Council as well as being Vice-president of the Commission. 
This job entails ensuring a coherent foreign policy across the various relevant EU 
institutions and between the member states. Furthermore, the creation of the 
European External Action Service provides a new diplomatic service of the EU, 
assisting the High Representative in performing tasks (Egeberg, 2013, pp 129-142).  
 
Even though the CFSP officially remains intergovernmental, the Lisbon Treaty’s 
contribution to enforcing supranational agencies upon this institutional structure, 
constructivist scholar argues that this have affected the presence of the EU’s 
identity, referring to the common values and norms of the Union. By this is meant 
that in the end, the EU interests will to some extent also impact the member-states’ 
interests (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).  
This viewpoint will form the basis of this project’s investigation of the crisis 
management within the CFSP. The Lisbon Treaty’s establishment of supranational 
involvement in the CFSP plays a significant role when examining the crisis 
management. Wagner (2003) argues that the crisis management area within the 
CFSP is more prone towards adhering to EU norms rather than national interests, 
despite of discussions taking place in an intergovernmental  institutional framework, 
because of the circumstances of the individual cases of crisis management. These 
cases often calls for immediate action within a limited timeframe which, means that 
the Council will have to take decisions without national governments being able to 
determine their specific interests in the crisis. 
 
The crisis management of the CFSP, will in this project be argued to be influenced 
by such norms, focusing on the human rights norm of the EU often encouraging 
action within the crisis management, as well as joint action in the shape of 
consensus reaching when conducting policies. In order to investigate the extent to 
which these norms has influenced the decision-making process of the crisis 
management within the CFSP, this project will examine the current Syrian civil war. 
This crisis has gained the attention of the EU which at first urged the Council to take 
action operating under the CFSP´s area of crisis management. The decision to 
interfere was made on the basis of what the Union saw as substantial violations of 
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human rights towards the population of Syria (High Representative declaration, 
2011).  
 
The Council, through the CFSP agreed on suspending all cooperation programmes 
with the Syrian regime. These suspensions affected Syrian involvement with the 
European Central Bank in the provision of technical assistance. Furthermore, the 
violent repression of the Assad-Regime against peaceful demonstrators was 
responded by the CFSP in terms of financial constraints, from the initial suspension 
of cooperation to more restrictive measures in oil, banking and trade, in order to put 
pressure in the Syrian regime into ending violence, and to support a political solution 
to the conflict (EEAS, n.d.a). 
  
As a response to the conflict, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFA’s) in the CFSP 
created a number of joint communications and strategies, while at the same time 
leading the international response in terms of development and humanitarian aid 
ever since the beginning of the conflict (EEAS, n.d.a). 
So even though the EU condemns what has happened in Syria in terms of the 
human rights violations, the EU’s crisis management’s  actual actions has not been 
equivalent to its rhetorical condemnations, as most actions are mostly 
communications to discourage further human rights violations. The question 
therefore remains of why the EU’s crisis management in Syria has not been more 
comparable to it’s judgement of the human rights violations. 
  
This project would like to explore on to what capacity the CFSP´s crisis management 
has been influenced or impacted by norms of human rights and joint actions, which 
are reflected in the Lisbon and Maastricht treaty, in terms of the EU involvement in 
the Syrian crisis. How present are they within the crisis management of the CFSP 
and do they enable action or inaction.  
In order to investigate the impact of EU´s norms upon the Common Foreign Security 
Policy area, this project uses the following research question. 
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1.2 Research Question 
  
How does adherence to human rights and joint action norms 
impact the decision-making of the CFSP´s crisis management and 
what influence does this have on the EU's aim of further integration 
of its member states? 
  
This project will set out to answer this research question with the following working 
questions: 
  
1. How has increased cooperation in EU foreign policy evolved over time and how 
has this lead to the creation of the CFSP with it’s current norms? 
 
This project will answer this working question by describing the CFSP creation 
as a social construction by its member states and the evolution of norms 
within it from the European political cooperation to the CFSP after the Lisbon 
treaty. 
  
2. How has adherence to EU norms of human rights and joint action influenced 
CFSP´s crisis management of the ongoing Syrian conflict? 
 
The project will set out to answer this working question by determining the 
rational-legal aspects of the EU, and their influence on promoting the EU 
identity within the different institutional settings of the organisation. The 
project will then continue on to categorize the two norms defining in the 
negotiation process within the CFSP’s crisis management in Syria using 
definitions from Thomas (2009) and Finnemore & Sikkink (1998). Through the 
application of Thomas’ (2009) model of entrapment within the theory of 
Normative Institutionalism, the possible adherence or nonadherence to these 
norms will be examined.     
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3. How has crisis management in the CFSP influenced member states integration 
within the European Union? 
 
This working question will be answered by discussing the result of the 
analysis and placing these findings within the broader debates about 
European integration.  
  
1.3 Project Structure 
Our main argument in this project is that norm adherence has influenced the EU´s 
foreign policy and how member states through CFSP made decisions about the 
Syrian civil war crisis. 
In order to argue for this, the project provides a structure where chapter 2 will outline 
the project's theoretical considerations. The chapter starts out by explaining our 
theoretical perspectives in regards to International organizations and defining 
different types of norms. Then the theory of normative institutionalism is explained 
and an operationalization of our theory for the project is given. 
 
Chapter 3 will outline our methodological choices, in this chapter we will explain our 
philosophical standpoints in social science research, as well as our choice of 
empirical material, our methods to analyse this material and our de-limitations in 
regards to our project.   
 
Chapter 4 will serve as background for the project, where the evolution of European 
political cooperation will be explained as well as the current foreign policy objectives 
of the CFSP. Moreover, the background for our case of the Syrian civil war, where 
the main conflict, the violations of human rights and the EU role in this conflict so far 
will be explained. 
 
Chapter 5 then moves to examine adherence and nonadherence to norms. By first 
establishing a European identity and discussing the establishment of the two norms 
discussed in this project. Then the chapter sets out to explore, what the EU has done 
in regards of managing the Syrian civil war crisis, and finally the chapter analyses 
adherence and non-adherence to these norms by exploring the five factors affecting 
CFSP decision-making in regards to the Syrian conflict. 
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Chapter 6 will then discuss the implications of the findings in chapter five, and relate 
these findings into general discussions about the CFSP regarding its formal and 
informal workings as well as discussions in relation to European integration. 
 
Finally, chapter 7 will conclude this project by summarizing our findings and 
discussions, as well as posing future questions in regards to research about the 
CFSP as well as future considerations. We conclude that decision-making in crisis 
management by the European Union can be explained through adherence to norms 
and values, but that action can be reduced by the lack of capabilities of the 
European institutions.  
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Chapter 2: Theory 
 
This chapter aims is to explain the theoretical considerations of this project, as well 
as the reasonings behind the choice of theory, in order to do so, the chapter will look 
first at theories of international organizations and normative power, then the chapter 
will set to define, what are norms and in the end the chapter will pose the theory of 
normative institutionalism and operationalize our theoretical choices in regards to the 
project.  
 
This project’s choice of theory has fallen upon constructivism and more specifically 
Martha Finnemore’s and Michael Barnett's (1999)  constructivist view of what an 
international organization is and what is it capable of. While the European Union, 
which is the topic for this project might be said to be something more than just an 
international organization (IO), Barnett & Finnemore’s research on IO’s normative 
power gives this project significant insight into the possible influence the EU can 
have on the decision-making processes in areas, where member-states legally holds 
power such as the Common Foreign Security Policy. 
 
2. 1 IO’s and their normative power. 
In the article ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’ 
(1999) Barnett and Finnemore reject the liberalist and realist view of IO’s as simply 
an ‘empty shell’ (Ibid, 1999) for states to control. They argue that while states often 
are the creators of an IO they criticize the two theories for not paying attention to an 
organization's autonomy after its creation; e.g. its institutional framework and 
normative values, which can both restrict and influence member state behaviour 
(Ibid, 1999).  
Barnett and Finnemore (1999), inspired by sociological institutionalism, therefore 
turn their attention to what they label the ‘rational-legal’ authority of an IO. The 
rational-legal aspect of an organisation represents the aspect of it that exists apart 
from its member-states. Upon an IO’s creation, Barnett & Finnemore (1999) argues, 
that the organisation will embody a separate authority; the rational-legal, which is the 
part of the organisation that makes it function. This aspect comes to show in many 
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different forms in the institutional framework of an IO. While the member-states may 
be the ones supporting or opposing specific policies, the rational-legal authority can 
be responsible for e.g. the daily workforce and their tasks of promoting the 
organisation’s identity, which often are the ones conducting research for policy-
proposals. An IO can therefore, if it has a strong presence of rational-legal actors, 
influence member-states in policy discussions towards the organisation’s identity by 
e.g. promoting the norms of the organisation, as opposed to national interests, even 
if the organisation in itself holds no formal authority (Barnett & Finnemore,  1999).  
Alongside the ‘rational-legal’ aspect of an organization, Barnett & Finnemore (1999) 
also stresses the importance of an IO’s ‘control over expertise’ (Ibid:707). The 
control over expertise becomes relevant, since it is the organisation that supervise 
and organize the daily staff and not the member states representatives, which often 
only meets monthly or quarterly to negotiate policies with other member states. 
Thereby, the organisation attain an autonomy, that can hold significant power in 
shaping the foundation for the state representatives negotiations, through the daily 
staff, which often are responsible for conducting the research regarding policy 
proposals. For instance, within the EU, the Commission holds no legal power, 
although its tasks of formulating policy-proposals and often implementing them after 
they have been approved in the Council and Parliament, can be argued to give it a 
large, however, indirect influence over how the policies are shaped. The fact that the 
Commission also is divided into several specialist sub-research groups all monitoring 
each other in order to best collaborate, and that it is a rule that the member state 
representatives in the Commission needs to have secretaries from at least three 
different countries indicates that the daily work-force works towards promoting the 
organization’s best interests as opposed to member-states’ interests (Egeberg, 
2013, pp 129-142). The EU therefore holds significant control over expertise, which 
member-states in the e.g. the Council may not have access to other than examining 
the policy draft (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p 719).   
The theory’s explanation of the indirect autonomy an IO can hold, even though its 
creation and existence is dependent on member states, builds this project's 
framework for examining the decision-making process of crisis management within 
the EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy.  The next section will present a 
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conceptualization of a ‘norm’ and how it can become an integral part of an 
organization's treaty-based framework. 
2.2 Norms in the political sphere. 
 
In constructivist research, it is important to be clear about the mechanism on how 
norms, ideas and culture shape political behavior and provide substantial historical 
and empirical evidence. It is important to realize that a norm can exist, but that many 
members of the particular community, which this norm is said to influence may not 
give as much importance to that norm as others; hence, the strength of the norm is 
diminished. Therefore, it is important to show, by pattern of behavior, how many 
actors subscribe to a specific norm and how this norm is affecting the actors’ 
behavior. In the case of the CFSP, by looking at the setting of the agendas, press 
releases, and policy outcomes of the meetings, this project can evaluate if a norm is 
shared or if it is contested between the actors of the community (the EU). For that 
reason, a proper definition of norms needs to be given as well as how these norms 
came to be, and their possible impact on the community in regards to shaping 
behaviour.  
 
This project uses a definition of norm stemming from Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) 
and Finnemore (1996), who defines norms in a sociological way, as: “shared 
expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors” (Ibid, 1996, 
p 22). In this sense norms are norms, because they are shared and social; they are 
intersubjective. Norms thereby constitutes a way to understand the meaning and/or 
guidelines of a certain behavior. Furthermore, while norms can become rules and 
their guidelines for behaviour, they can still be broken, but the fact is that the 
involved actors will often recognize the unusual behavior as a violation, which 
underlines the possible impact norms can have in shaping behaviour within a 
community (ibid, 1996). 
As some norms becomes rules and therefore is easily identifiable, other norms can 
simply exist within a certain institutional framework without having been 
institutionalised into treaties. These norms often come to show in the way the 
specific community interacts e.g. the consensus norm of the Common Foreign 
Security Policy area which is one of the norm for examination in this project. In order 
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more specifically determine these norms Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) presents three 
types of definitions of norms existing in a community which are the ‘regulative’, 
‘constitutive’ and ‘prescriptive’ norms. Regulative norms represents the norms in a 
community which shapes and limits behaviour. The constitutive norms often has the 
role of establishing new actors and and other types of change in the community. 
Often these norms become institutionalised in treaties. Finally, prescriptive norms 
are the ones that provide the more standardized version of appropriate behavior 
(Ibid, 1998). 
 
In the field of international norms, many norms start being domestic norms and 
become international for a number of reasons and motivations of certain actors. 
From a constructivist perspective, the international structure is determined by the 
international distribution of ideas (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Shared ideas about 
how to behave in a good manner is what has brought about the current world 
structure. It is important to note here that actors creating, sharing and adhering to 
these norms are not limited to just states. Any actor operating on a global scale can 
contribute to these norms and therefore International Organisations (IO’s) such as 
the EU can turn out to be a very influential actor (Ibid, 1998).  
 
An important point regarding international norms is that sometimes, they can be 
influenced by specific national norms in their way to become embedded in states, 
and hence there can be different levels of compliance and interpretation of these 
norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Although as explained above, states are 
influenced by the international system, so it is a back and forth process between 
national and international (or regional) norms. 
 
However, it is important to realize that states are interdependent with each other and 
have higher levels of socialization between neighbors, for that reason; there is an 
increasing influence on state interests of international norms. Therefore, dissimilar 
actors may make similar behavioral actions as international norms and shared ideas 
that may influence said actors. 
 
At the same time it is important to understand the evolution of a norm throughout 
history, in the beginning, norms may have a small amount of actors on which they 
12 
influence behavior, but over time more actors will subscribe to said norms and in the 
end the norms is interiorized by the whole community. Norms can also add different 
patterns of behavior and actions to what they entail as norm (Finnemore, 1996). For 
example, the number of patterns of behavior related to sovereignty increased over 
time since Westphalia, but now the increased interdependence of countries and 
affiliation of countries to different regional and international treaties, plus the cultural 
effects of globalization has created a situation where sovereignty’s normative 
strength may have been reduced. 
 
2.3 Normative Institutionalism 
In the previous sections, this project has presented how the normative values of an 
IO can impact member-states decisions, and how shared norms can hold significant 
influence within the international system. This section will continue along that line by 
presenting a framework for analysis by Daniel C. Thomas established in his theory of 
normative institutionalism, in order to help this project determine the impact of these 
norms on the negotiation processes, within the CFSP crisis management. 
Daniel C. Thomas (2009) has conducted case studies of 14 different policy 
negotiations within the EU's Foreign Policy area, where there was conflicting 
interests between member states. He found that the EU’s normative values played a 
significant role when the decision-makers negotiated. The consensus-based policy 
outcomes of the CFSP tended to be highly influenced by norms when two or more 
conditions of what he dubs ‘Entrapment’ were present.  
The framework is based on his concept of member states ‘entrapping’ each other in 
the policy negotiations by referring to the existing norms of the relevant organisation. 
Thomas (2009) argues, that when upon entering an IO, in this case the European 
Union, member states are forced to comply with certain norms of the organisation 
regardless of these norms coexisting in a treaty or simply in the more abstract 
‘unwritten’ rules of the organisation's behaviour. Such norms become relevant during 
policy negotiations since they enable member states to use them as a tool to entrap 
interests that are conflicting with the organization’s normative purpose of the policy 
(Ibid, 2009). For instance, a policy proposal prohibiting trade with a non-EU state for 
violations against human rights is negotiated in the CFSP. A few member states 
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oppose this policy due to different national interests e.g. possible export losses. The 
remaining lot can then entrap these states in the negotiations by building their 
arguments of the policy approval on the state's commitment to promoting human 
rights through their membership of the European Union. The opposing states will 
then find themselves entrapped by having to commit to the EU’s normative values or 
face a reputation-loss within the organisation according to Thomas (Ibid, 2009).  
Thomas (2009) lists two types of norms, which impacts different aspects of the 
possible entrapment procedure, namely ‘means-oriented & ends-oriented 
norms’.The norms that has become institutionalised in treaties and declarations are 
ends-oriented, since they determine the goal of the policy such as e.g. promoting 
human rights, which is one of the norms of the EU that this project will focus on. The 
means-oriented norms however, are the ones that shapes the process for 
negotiations. The means-oriented norm of this project will be joint actions or more 
specifically the wish for consensus among the policy negotiators. 
Through these norms, member-states can entrap each other in policy discussions by 
referring to non-adherence to these norms. Thomas (2009) emphasizes that this 
type of entrapment is most likely to occur if the policy-makers are under time-
pressure, since the norms of the organisation will then play a larger role in the 
decision-making process, than if the member-states had time to process extensive 
data examination.  
In order to analyse the probability of these norms impacting the policy negotiations 
through entrapment, Thomas has presented five conditions based on his findings of 
the 14 case studies, which can impact the entrapment of the member states. All of 
these five conditions impacts entrapment, although the probability of this occurring is 
larger when e.g. Determinacy & Relevance are present at the same time.  
 These five condition are the following; 
● Determinacy: If the norms regarding the policy are clear (determinant) 
in the sense of easily understandable and applicable to the specific 
situations, entrapment will be very likely to occur. It will be fairly 
accessible for the decision-makers to refer to the norm and use it as an 
argument against opposers, which will then experience the entrapment, 
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since it is they who are going against the norms of the organisation, 
whom they are members of. 
● Precedent:  If there is a previous policy present on the area, which is 
relevant to the norms of the policy. 
● Relevance: The norms used to entrap needs to be relevant to the 
external conditions of the policy. Thomas uses the example of of a poor 
country gaining EU market access: “an EU commitment to offer 
privileged market access to a particular country because it is poor 
would no longer entrap Member States if that country ceased to be 
poor ” (Thomas, 2009, p 346). Thereby the entrapment of relevance is 
weakened if the situation e.i. the external conditions changes. 
● Forum: The entrapment is being enforced, if the meetings are taking 
place within an EU institution since referring to adherence of EU norms 
will have more power in such a building than within a national 
governance building. 
● Publicity: If the policy negotiations are receiving public attention, the 
entrapment is again enforced, since the public pressure of obliging to 
the pre-existing norms of the organisation, which the state is a member 
of, will be increased. 
These five forces or conditions will be the foundation for this project’s analysis in 
order to determine the extent of norm adherence in the intergovernmental 
environment of the CFSP´s crisis management. Furthermore, while adherence to 
these norms of promoting human rights & reaching decisions through consensus in 
certain situations can be hard to quantify and thereby measure, the purpose of this 
chapter has therefore been to conceptualize this projects stance on something as 
abstract as a norm. The different constructivist theories presented in this chapter all 
contribute to a clearer understanding of the different aspects and actors in which an 
organisation’s normative values has an effect.  
 
2.4 Operationalization 
In adopting a constructivist ontology, this project acknowledges the importance of the 
mechanism on how norms, ideas and culture shape political behavior and provide 
substantial historical and empirical evidence. It is important to realize that a norm 
15 
can exist, but that many members of the particular community, which this norm is 
said to influence, may not give as much importance to that norm as others; hence, 
the strength of the norm is diminished. 
 
Therefore, it is important to show, by pattern of behavior, how actors subscribe to a 
specific norm, its impact on behaviour, and its marginal role if conditions within a 
specific situation change. In the case of the CFSP, by looking at the setting of the 
agendas, press releases, and outcomes of the meetings, this project tries to evaluate 
the extent which the negotiation process in the CFSPs crisis management has been 
influenced by such norms.  
 
However, in order to enable and clarify a further investigation of the influence a norm 
can have on crisis management, it is necessary to establish this project’s foundation 
for how the further analysis understands and acknowledges the chosen subject. In 
the following chapter this project will explain its ontological and epistemological 
standpoints regarding theory and material to include the reader into the perspective 
of this project.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
In this chapter, the project will introduce the ontological and epistemological 
perspectives used to frame the reality and knowledge within the subject of the CFSP 
crisis management. Following will be an explanation of the project’s choice of 
empirical material and case study along with a limits come across while conducting 
research.   
  
3.1 Philosophy of Social Science 
  
This project uses a constructivist approach to understand social reality and social 
entities. A constructivist approach entails that actors are viewed as continually 
creating and interpreting structures and values in and of the international system 
(Bryman 2012, pp 33-37).  
 
Regarding this project’s choice of subject, the ontology views the individual member 
states as actors both influencing the development of the CFSP, as well as being 
influenced by the institution’s underlying norms. This ontology is reflected in the 
constructivist theories applied in the analysis of the CFSPs crisis management in 
Syria, by their focus on the changeable normative values and their impact on the 
decision-making. These norms, it is argued, are constructed and maintained through 
social actors interaction and acknowledgement of their importance. 
 
Regarding this project’s empirical material, an interpretivist approach to 
epistemology has been conducted. This means that the project is aware and tries to 
acknowledge that the EU’s & its member-states’ interpretation of the social world  
has determined how the EU framed the Syrian crisis (first by taking action to promote 
human rights, then viewing it as a security issues instead) and what the CFSP 
institution should constitute. Thereby this project aims at recognising that actors 
interpret the world and thereby creates their own subjective understanding of social 
entities and structures. 
The project is placing itself within a post-positivist spectrum in understanding social 
happenings. This project has interpreted the EU member states as having two 
interconnected identities in international relations. Their first identity is that of an 
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independent sovereign state, with their own national interests and values, who is a 
member of the European Union. Their second identity, is that of being a European 
Union, in which states have the same values and norms with other states of the 
Union, and therefore an EU shared identity exists.  
 
Furthermore, this project acknowledges that a norm such as human rights can be 
static for a period of time, but only because human rights have been interpreted and 
defined by a dominant actor (in this case the EU) (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p 13). This 
norm may then have been the traditional reference for human rights, but it is neither 
objective nor subject for an universal truth. It has been through a process of 
interpretation by subjective actors trying to define its purpose based on their 
experience. Furthermore, others with different perspectives can develop the norm 
and therefore the norm will never be incontestable, although it may not change all 
the time.   
  
In relation to this project’s analysis we are using an interpretivist approach, when we 
are describing the syrian crisis as a human rights crisis, thus interpreting the 
complex syrian civil war as a human rights crisis, affects our focus in the research. 
Therefore, this has also affected our data search, as we have collected documents 
focusing on this human rights context.  
 
3.2 Choice of empirical material and content analysis 
 
This project will mainly be using qualitative sources in the shape of books, journal 
articles, policy documents, press releases and newspaper articles in order to answer 
the research question. These sources has been examined by the use of the content 
analysis method.  
 
The choice of mainly using qualitative sources are based on the fact that qualitative 
sources, primarily in the form of policy documents, allows us to perform an in-depth 
investigation of the CFSP decision-making process, regarding the case of Syria. The 
fact that norm adherence in crisis management is hard to quantifiably measure 
without access to negotiations within the institution also plays a role in the choice of 
data.  
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Furthermore, we are using a qualitative approach in our content analysis of  the 
policies document, as we are searching for specific themes in the materials we are 
analysing, chosen by the authors of this project (Bryman, 2012, pp 528-529). When 
we are interpreting the individual policy document, we look for the specific theme of 
human rights present in the document. We do so to understand human rights norm 
influence in the creation of the policy document (Beiber and Leavy, 2011, pp 227-
254). This needs to be done in order to understand norms influence on member 
states  decision making. 
  
In relation to the background of European foreign policy cooperation, we will be 
using secondary sources in forms of books and journal articles, which are written by 
experts and scholars in the field of international relations, in order to understand the 
institutional setting of the CFSP. 
At the same time, we will be using primary sources in the form of the Amsterdam 
treaty, Maastricht treaty, Lisbon treaty, CPH report and Luxembourg report in order 
to understand the purpose of the CFSP and the institution’s main objectives in 
foreign relations. These treaties will be analysed with the content analysis method, 
as we will put emphasis in the evolution of norms through those treaties.  
Lastly, in the syrian background, we will also be using secondary sources in the form 
of newspaper articles to describe the conflict, due to the Syrian crisis being a 
contemporary crisis and emphasizing the violations of human rights in the conflict. 
 
In relation our analysis of the Syrian crisis, we will  also be using secondary sources 
in the form of newspaper articles to investigate the setting of the negotiations, like 
how much publicity is there around the Syrian issue in Europe. 
We will also be using primary sources in the form of press releases and policy 
documents from the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council, in order to 
understand the policy outcomes from the European Union in regards to the Syrian 
crisis, were the  content analysis method will be used in order to emphasize the 
adherence to norms of consensus and human rights. 
In relation to our discussion of EU member state integration, we will be using 
secondary sources from experts in different academic fields in order to discuss our 
findings in terms of broader debates about the EU.  
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In relation to our choices of primary sources, we found that documents role in 
organizations can be interpreted  differently (Prior, 2009). Our project has chosen an 
approach that focus on the actual content of the policy documents, thereby viewing 
documents as being the product of social actor interaction within the organization. 
However, if we had direct access to actual meetings and the discussion between the 
member states, we could investigate how the CFSP´s foreign policy objectives, 
which are stated in the treaties (documents) had shaped member states interactions 
and the policy outcomes (Prior, 2009).   
 
In addition, a limitation to this research has been access to documents, we were not 
able to investigate the discussions from the Foreign Affairs Council meetings, due to 
a lack of transparency, which could have given us more insights into how norms are 
reflected in the actual discussions and debates that happen during decision making 
processes.  
However, we were able to investigate the outcomes of the meetings, in which they 
explained the reasons behind the agreed foreign policies. This allowed us to some 
extent to understand how norms and values had influence the decision-making 
process during the meetings. 
While using the method of content analysis to investigate our sources, we have also 
chosen to use the method of a case study to study the decision making processes in 
the CFSP. 
  
 
3.3 Choice of case study 
  
We have decided to use a case study, in order to understand the Foreign Affairs 
Council’s crisis management through the CFSP.  
Flyvbjerg (2006) explains that by choosing one single phenomena out of an entire 
class of social phenomena (in our case member states decision making in CFSP´s 
crisis management), it allows researchers to do an in-depth and time efficient 
investigation of this single social phenomenon and to some extent understand 
certain characteristic about this entire class of social phenomena.   
In our project, we will be using a case study to understand how the member states of 
the EU handles international crisis through CFSP, by taking one particular 
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international crisis and understand the member states motivations and actions in this 
particular crisis (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
However, this project still argues that our case-study gives us some idea of how 
norms influence the CFSP´s decision-making process regarding crisis management. 
However, we are not trying generalize our case-study of CFSP´s crisis management 
by claiming that norms always have a substantial influence in their crisis 
management policies. Because as Flyvbjerg (2006) explains, researchers can only 
use a single case-study as a falsification tool towards already existing theories, when 
they are trying generalize and abstract based on single case-study. 
 
In choosing our case-study, we investigated the possibility of Ukraine and Syria as a 
case study. However, we found that the European member states in the Ukraine 
crisis had conflicting interest, and did not agree on how to frame the conflict. This 
would have complicated our investigation of how EU and its member states complied 
with norms and value found within the EU framework, when they were conducting 
their foreign policy. These complications meant that we choose the Syrian Civil war 
as our case study for CFSP´s crisis management, as in that case the EU’s framing of 
the conflict was much clearer in terms of human rights violations. In terms of this 
case study, since it is a contemporary event our time frame has been from the 
beginning of the conflict in 2011 to 2015.  
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Chapter 4: European Foreign Policy, political cooperation 
and the creation of the CFSP as an institution. 
 
In this chapter, the evolution of the CFSP as an institution, from the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970’s to now, and the creation of norms such as 
joint action will be explained. This section will also explain the current state of the 
CFSP and its foreign policy objectives and principles as shown by the treaties. 
Furthermore, an introduction to the Syrian civil war and the violations of human rights 
occurring, as well as the EU involvement in the crisis will be presented.  
 
4.1 European Political Cooperation 
 
Since the 1950’s, there was attempts at creating a Common European Foreign 
policy. Examples of these attempts are the European Defense community in 1954 
proposed by the French prime minister at the time, the European Political 
Community that started to develop also in 1954, but was dropped the same year, 
and the Fouchet Plans of the 1960’s (Smith, 2003, pp 66-70). All these attempts 
failed, according to Smith (2003, pp 63-70), because it was hard to agree what the 
European foreign policy cooperation was supposed to be. 
 
This skepticism of the past did not stop new attempts for trying to improve foreign 
policy cooperation, however, it did influence it (Smith, 2003 pp 68-71). Up until the 
late 60’s, member states positions in a lot of foreign policy issues were very different 
from each other, for examples in issues like the middle east (Ibid, 2003, p 63). There 
were no procedures or mechanisms in place for countries to cooperate, there wasn’t 
even an agreement on whether or not Europe was the best platform to cooperate in 
foreign policy at the time, when the US and Russia were not present on that platform 
(Ibid: p 63). 
 
With these problems, and the memory of attempts of the past, and even as Smith 
(2003, p 67) argues that the states still could not figure out the impasse between 
intergovernmental and supranational ideas of political cooperation. There was still an 
agreement in Strasburg in 1969 to have ministers of foreign affairs meetings four 
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times a year. For that reason on Nov.19 1970, the first meeting of foreign affairs 
ministers was conducted in the framework of the so-called EPC, “European Political 
Cooperation” as created by the Luxembourg report of 1970 (Smith, 2003, pp 63-89). 
In this new framework of the EPC, negotiators tried to work with both 
intergovernmental and supranational visions, however, other ideas also could create 
division e.g. enlargement. EPC succeeded in matters where others had failed 
because it avoided these ideas: it is neither supranational nor wholly 
intergovernmental (Ibid, 2003, p 70). 
 
However, in the end, the Luxembourg report is a very loose framework as it does not 
give specification on the topics of discussion that the foreign ministers are going to 
have (Smith, 2003, pp 63-89), as it only referred to members cooperating in foreign 
policy spheres. (Lux. Rep. 1970 part 2 ). In terms of norms in the EPC, the 
luxembourg strengthen the norm of joint action by emphasizing the cooperation of 
member states. However in terms of other norms such as human rights, it was not 
clear that the countries were as prepared to comply with that norm. In terms of crisis 
management, it´s interesting to see that the wording of the Luxembourg report did 
not really delimit the scope into where countries could cooperate, so in its inception 
the EPC was more concerned with fixing internal incoherence than to produce any 
external action (Smith 2003, p 85). 
 
In addition to this, it is important to remark that from the beginning of the EPC, there 
was a relationship with the European Community (EC), which as established by the 
Luxembourg report, any applicant to EC should also accept the EPC institutional 
framework, something which shows how both the EC and the EPC were considered 
tools of integration. (Smith 2003 74-75; Lux. Rep. 1970 part 4) 
 
Although for EC applicants of the time it was easy to comply with EPC (something 
which has changed over time) as it was considered “a private club, operated by 
diplomats, for diplomats” subject to the goodwill of its members, run strictly by 
consensus, and largely closed to outside scrutiny (Smith, 2003, p 75). 
 
According to Hill (1983,p 189) EPC happened for external factors: Change in 
government in France, a failure from part of the EC to respond to the six-day war, 
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and the EU’s first enlargement, where France insisted on more enlargement, if only 
more political integration from the existent and new EC members also happened. 
The EPC allowed for more political integration by highly increasing the role of the 
member states foreign ministries (ibid, 1983, p 189). This increased their role to an 
extent, where the foreign ministries became a sort of lobby for the benefits of 
common external policies, on the grounds of international effectiveness and the 
motivation for general cooperation within the community (ibid, 1983, p 189). 
 
This motivation for integration and the push of foreign ministries lead quickly to more 
integration in the EPC framework. First and foremost, in the terms of information 
sharing. By 1975, there was already a “reflex of coordination” by members of the 
EPC, meaning a habit of consultation in an automatic way on foreign policy issues , 
something enhanced by the improvement of information sharing (Smith 2003, pp.94-
95), this information helps us to understand how the social construction of the CFSP 
started, as it shows how through more and more socialization, states started to work 
together more often.  
 
As shown by the next report, the Copenhagen report: “this habit of working together 
has enabled the procedure for concerted action to become more widespread 
wherever common action or common consideration is desirable”. (CPH report 1973, 
part 1). 
 
The language on this report as Smith (2003, pp 95-96) argues, created a new 
diplomatic practice among member states foreign representatives of consulting each 
other. Which meant that member states must not take up a definite foreign policy 
position in major issues before prior discussion with their European partners, giving a 
hint towards one of the norms of the current European union, joint action. 
 
In addition, EPC’s communication systems were purposely structured to produce 
consensus, and not to push for national interests. (Smith 2003,pp 90-98). Eventually, 
this promoted formation of common views to solve common problems and not to 
defend national interests (Smith 2003 pp.90-98). The main mechanism for this 
communication was the COREU (correspondence Européene). The COREU system 
was a system used to communicate simultaneously with all EC states about foreign 
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policy issues and its operations costs were splitted equally by EPC members, 
“making it the only permanent, collectively financed manifestation of EU foreign 
policy until 1986” (Smith 2003, p 98) 
 
Even with this improvement in communication, EPC remained largely 
intergovernmental, and with the creation of the EU council in 1974, EU heads of 
state and government consolidated their authority over both EC and EPC (Smith, 
2003, pp 98-99). However, the EU council could not provide much central direction 
as it only meets twice a year and discussions can take a long time. Now with all the 
contemporary enlargements, it can take up to two hours, just so everyone gets to 
express their views in one particular issue, something that limits more in-depth 
discussions in many issues (Smith, 2003, p 99). 
 
In contrast, the bureaucrats from the foreign ministries was in direct contact and had 
hundreds of meetings each year. This allowed for more cohesion and common 
analysis of foreign policy issues rather than analysis focused on national interests 
(Smith 2003, p 101). At the same time, socialization among bureaucrats is what 
gives the EPC a consensus approach, Nuttal (1997, p 3) explains from experience: 
“Meetings were important, but so where lunches and dinners and agreeable 
little excursions, and the atmosphere depended on light procedures and not 
too many participants” 
 
Therefore, the conductors of foreign policy in member states changed their attitudes 
not only on foreign policy, but also on how they perceived each other, even 
sometimes by seeing themselves as partners for the same goal. 
 
All the communication improvements resulted in each member state knowing what 
the other state wanted or was interested in regarding foreign policy issues. This 
brought more cohesion towards a common goal and spurred the need for even more 
institutionalization as well as creation of norms and rules in European foreign policy. 
(Smith, 2003, pp 90-116). 
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4.2 Norms and Standards in European foreign policy 
 
Through the increase in communication and further integration, there was a demand 
for more common norms and standards on foreign policy issues in the EU. These 
norms and standards created a higher level of group behavior by translating values 
and ideas from the EC chambers into specifics behaviors. In the case of foreign 
policy in the EPC, norms allowed the evolution of EPC from a passive forum to a 
collective foreign policy decision-making enterprise. Despite states continuously 
demanding the right to their sovereignty and did not like the legalization of this 
cooperation to happen (Smith, 2003, p 117). 
  
This norms of cooperation and joint action created were viewed as more than just 
expectations or habits, these norms influenced behavior of the actors that 
participated in EPC (Ibid p 119) . 
Once these norms were established even if just informally, the states generally 
supported their use, even if they did not agree with specific policies. One of these 
norms, which has been present since EPC and has kept appearing until the present 
is the obligation to arrive at common decisions, and move towards a common foreign 
policy (Smith, 2003, pp 117-144 ). 
 
Smith (2003, pp 122-125) argues that one of the main points that made the EPC 
work was privacy, this would encourage confidence, and the result was further 
consultation, which gave options to build consensus. Although any decisions has to 
be taken unanimously, it can be seen that even though states could veto any 
decisions, they did not resorted to the lowest level of consensus by threatening to 
veto, but rather tended to compromise hoping for a solution. (Interviews with 
EPC/CFSP participants, Brussels 95-96 in Smith, 2003,p 123).  
 
However, this consensus behaviors in the EPC are very much focused on the use of 
policy tools rather than military operations. This can be seen in the fact that foreign 
ministries and not defense ministries were the actors conducting foreign policy in the 
EU (Smith, 2003, pp 132-133 ).  
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In terms of crisis management, this means that what countries would do as EPC 
would be to communicate a common position, most of the times, or use diplomatic 
rather than military approaches to crisis, this is exemplified by the common positions 
in crisis such as the Portuguese revolt (1974), the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey conflict of 
1974 or the executions of terrorist from the Basque country in Spain in 1975 (Smith, 
2003, pp 108-112).  Furthermore and in a more proactive approach to foreign policy, 
when dealing with the middle-east crisis of 1973. EPC meetings resulted in a plan of 
action. Involving opening contact with the arab league, the creation of EU-arab 
working groups, and planning a big conference between all the foreign affairs 
ministers of the EU and the Middle East (Smith, 2003, p 112). 
 
Even though states had and still have individual positions at the time EPC was 
formed and while it existed, over time this positions have changed towards more 
common understanding and more allowance for all types of discussions (Smith, 
2003, p 144). This made the EPC’s agenda more coherent and extended to many 
issues, as it was clear for the members that independent foreign policies would be 
more detrimental to their interest than common positions (Ibid, 2003,p 144). All the 
institutional work done during the EPC hence created a grounding for more common 
positions and joint actions under the CFSP which was created by the agreement in 
the Maastricht treaty of 1992 (Maastricht treaty, 1992, Title V).  
 
 
 
Table. 4.1 Institutions and foreign policy cooperation 
 
Table extracted from: Smith, M. E. (2003, p 51) “Europe's foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of 
cooperation” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
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As can be seen in the table above, there has been an exponential increase in the 
number of EPC actions its inception in 1970 up to 1985 (from 8 actions - to 24 
actions), and then after the  creation of the CFSP, the joint actions and common 
positions highly increased in 1990-95 to 94 actions. This table then showcases the 
strive of member states to cooperate and coordinate in foreign policy, this strive 
helps to the construction of the common foreign security policy as established by the 
Maastricht treaty of 1993.  
 
4.3 Foreign policy cooperation between Maastricht and Lisbon, 
1993-2007 
 
Smith (1998, pp 304-334) argues that the creation of the CFSP in 1992 lead to 
several important changes regarding European foreign policy. First, it created a 
forum with with rules and procedures, which created a standardized decision-making 
process that had not existed in the EPC. Furthermore, the  policies created within the 
CFSP were binding, once decided by the foreign affair council and implemented by 
the European council (Smith, 1998, pp 317-324).  
 
Secondly, the CFSP defined common interests between member states as foreign 
policy objectives of the CFSP and institutionalized norms and values common to 
member states regarding their conduct of foreign policy (Smith, 1998, pp 317-324).  
 
Thirdly, the EU Commision gained an increased role regarding foreign policy, due to 
the commission acting as a broker between the member states foreign affair minister 
and the overall European council with ministers from all the governmental position, in 
order to ensure consistency in european foreign policies, but also coherent policies 
regarding foreign policies and european policies in general (Smith,1998,pp 325-329).  
 
This meant expanded cooperation between those two institutions, but also that the 
commissioner's opinion was started to be considered in the foreign affair meetings 
(Smith, 1998,pp 325-329). However, there was still a lack of coordination and 
coherence between the European Council decisions and the decisions being made 
in other EU institutions (Smith, 1998,pp 325-333). For that reason, the EU created 
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the High Representative position with the Amsterdam treaty in 1997 to ensure 
coherent and consistent foreign affair policies (Amsterdam treaty, 2007, Article J.16).  
 
The High Representative specific role is to help formulate policies, assist with the 
preparation for foreign affair meetings and take part of the implementation of policies 
agreed by the member states during the foreign affair meetings (Amsterdam treaty, 
2007, Article J.16) . 
This gave the High Representative a sustainable indirect influence on the meetings, 
due to the High Representative being part of all formulation, decision-making and 
implementation of the EU foreign policy, which was done to ensure consistent and 
coherent foreign policies. 
 
In addition, the Lisbon treaty (2007, Article 9E) gave the High Representative a 
substantial larger role in EU foreign policy, and also created the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) to help the High Representative fulfilling her tasks (Lisbon 
Treaty, 2007, Article 13A) 
 
In terms of crisis management, during the early CFSP era and as shown by table 4.1 
the member states of the EU started coordinating their managing of foreign policy. 
However, a new aspect of crisis management also started appearing in the EU with 
the creation of a security strategy in 2003, and the Common Foreign Security and 
Defense Policy with the Lisbon treaty in 2007 (Common Defense and Security 
Policy, Article 48-53) , therefore the management of crisis started entailing both 
foreign policy tools but also actions carried out by the military of member states 
under an EU flag, as for example the policing in the horn of Africa when the piracy 
crisis occurred, or the European Peacekeeping mission in Bosnia which began in 
2004 (EEAS , n.d.b). 
 
All these developments between the Maastricht treaty of 1993 and the Lisbon treaty 
of 2007, have consequences, into what the CFSP as an institution is set to do, and 
the capabilities it has.    
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4.4 CFSP´s foreign policy objective and capabilities 
 
In the above sections, member states cooperation and integration has been shown 
to increase over time until the present time, where the actors involved in european 
foreign policy have agreed on a set of common objectives in their foreign policy.  
 
CFSP has various foreign policy objectives, which are stated in the Lisbon Treaty, 
Article 29, point 2: 
“The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall 
work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in 
order to: 
1. (a)Safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, 
interdependence, and integrity.  
2. (b)Consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law,, human rights 
and the principles of international law. 
3. (c) Preserve peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international 
security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter and”. 
4.  (h)  Promote an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance” 
 (Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Art. 29 point 2) 
 
These foreign policy objectives needs to pursued by the EU member states in 
consensus, due to member state's veto right regarding joint foreign policy.  
This means that a possible joint foreign policy might need to appeal to the various 
members states common identity as being part of the EU, in order to reach a 
consensus.  
This appeal to a common EU identity in reaching their foreign policy objective can be 
seen in section 2b, which states the CFSP shall  “Consolidate and Support 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international law” (Lisbon Treaty, 2007, 
Art. 29 point 2, section 2b) 
 . 
At the same time, this declaration of foreign objectives, gives the CFSP a point of 
focus, something that was not present in prior foreign policy cooperations, this gives 
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the EU a more focused point of discussion which should be reflected in their foreign 
policy.  
 
Furthermore, CFSP has various norms and values in its institutional setting, which 
guides them towards what foreign policies are appropriate to use on the international 
scene, according to the Lisbon treaty (2007, Article 29). Therefore, in order to 
conduct foreign policy without breaking either the United Nations Charter and human 
rights, the CFSP has limited foreign policy instruments at its disposal, these 
instruments are mostly development aid and sanctions.   
 
Derek Mix (2013) explains that one of the CFSP foreign policy tools are humanitarian 
aid and development assistance. The EU and its member states are the largest 
donor to humanitarian aid in the world, since it provides around 40% of the official 
global humanitarian assistance and over half of the global development assistance 
(Mix, 2013, p 23). 
 
This can also be seen in the Syrian crisis, where the EU has been one of the most 
generous donor in aiding Syrian civilians (European Council, 2015), which could be 
one of the ways the EU has managed this crisis. 
Humanitarian aid is a foreign policy tool, which does not go against the principles 
and values within CFSP in terms of what the treaty says, but still enables the EU to 
promote human rights across the world. 
 
Furthermore, Elliot, Hufbauer and Oegg (2008) explains that CFSP also has 
jurisdiction to perform economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. In recent times, 
economic sanctions has been used by the Foreign Affair Council in the Syrian crisis, 
based on a humanitarian ground (European Council, 2011a).   
This also indicates that the Foreign Affairs ministers are guided by its institutional 
values and principles, because economic sanctions are also a foreign policy tool that 
does not break with the United Nations Charter or human rights.  
 
In addition, these institutionalized norms and standards for how to conduct foreign 
policy by the EU, then reflect how member states perceive each other and their 
relationship through a European Union identity. It can be argued, that this identity 
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then guides how member states conduct foreign policy in terms of crisis 
management. In the case of the Syrian crisis, it is interesting to see why some of the 
objectives and principles are applied in this international crisis. However, in order to 
do so, we will have to explain how the Syrian conflict evolved, and showcase the 
escalation of human rights violations in Syria.  
 
4.5 The Syrian civil war 
 
In this section, the evolution of the Syrian conflict will be explained through a human 
rights perspective, including a section focusing solely on human rights violations in 
Syria. In addition, special focus will be given to the EU involvement in this conflict, as 
it is the main focus of this project.  
 
The Syrian civil war started as part of the Arab spring, which was a series of anti-
government protests across the Middle East. The peaceful Syrian protest started 15 
march 2010 at the capital of Damascus. This lead to a series of anti-governmental 
protests across Syria (Atlantic, 2015). However, the Syrian army started a series of 
large-scale military attacks on towns at 25 April, leading to hundreds of civilians 
death. By the end of May around 1000 civilians were killed (Britiannica academic, 
2015).  
 
These military attack on civilians lead to the creation of Free Syrian Army(FSA) in 
July 29. From July to October in 2011, there was an increase of violence from the 
government and rebel forces (Britiannica academic, 2015). This fighting lead to 
increased casualties from both sides, including civilians. This fueled the recruitment 
in the Free Syrian Army and the uprising against the Assad government. 
  
These indiscriminate attacks by the governmental forces lead to a ceasefire attempt 
by the UN and the Arab league. This attempted ceasefire lasted from April to May 
2012, with continued fighting between the governmental forces and rebellion during 
the period. The ceasefire officially ended in 2012, May 25 with the massacre of the 
Houla village by the government forces with 108 civilians death (The Atlantic, 2015). 
This sparked renewed fight between the Free Syrian army and the Syrian army. 
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Furthermore, when the fighting came back to full-scale, the United Nations declared 
on June 12 that Syria was in a state of civil war (BCC news, 2012). 
In the following 3 years, fighting between the rebel groups and government forces 
only increased. In 2014 from January to March, ISIS managed to claim a lot of 
territory from the anti-government forces and became a dominant player in the 
Syrian conflict (Britiannica academic, 2015). All of these conflict in the region has 
lead to a many deaths, and also human rights violations. 
 
Since the beginning of the conflict around 220.000 Syrian people had died in the 
Syrian civil war (NYtimes, 2015). Human Rights Watch (2015) has stated that the 
Syrian civil war is currently one of the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world, 
because of the systematic human right violations from the government and ISIS. 
One of the most famous violation of humanitarian rights in Syria was the 
government’s decision to use chemical weapons against towns held by the rebels in 
August 2013. 
 
In addition, almost every humanitarian right has been broken during the civil war. 
This include torture and execution of Syrians combatants, removal of liberty and 
security for majority of the Syrian civilian population, but also indiscriminate bombing 
of towns and regions held by the rebel forces. 
 
Atlantic (2015) explains that around half of the Syrian population are displaced, 
totaling 6.973.348 Syrians. This has a lead to major displacement of the Syrian 
population and caused migration from Syria. Migrantpolicycenter (2015) has 
investigated the displacement and migration in Syria. They found that around 
4.375.108 Syrians are currently refuges in other countries, while the rest of the 
displaced population counting 2.598.330 reside within the Syrian country. 
 
The European Union has received 310.140 Syrian refugees, although these 
refugees are spread out over 28 European countries.  
This massive amount of civilian refugees in neighboring countries has meant that 
these countries has a serious problem with feeding them and providing them a 
temporary living place. Furthermore, Human right Watch (2015) has characterized 
this refugee crisis as a humanitarian crisis, due to neighboring countries not being 
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able to provide them with basic necessities for survival, especially in the winter. 
These problems contradicts with CFSP´s foreign policy objectives of upholding 
human rights across the world.   
 
4.5.1 EU´s involvement in the Syrian crisis  
 
When the syrian crisis started in 2011, the EU along with its member states strongly 
condemned the human rights violations from the Assad regime and supported an UN 
intervention in Syria, although Russia vetoed against it (Adams, 2015) 
 
This prompted the EU and its CFSP institution to use its foreign policy tools to 
influence the events occurring in Syria. The EU made economic sanctions against 
the Assad regime in 2011 (European Council, 2011b), which include prohibition of 
buying oil, freezing individual regime leaders assets, prohibition of doing financial 
transactions or selling equipment that might help the regime suppress its population. 
 
Furthermore, the EU decided in 2012 to allocate 145.732.35 euro from the EU 
budget to help the syrian civilian population, who suffered under the assad regime 
and the civil war(European Commision: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, 
2012). The use of these foreign policy tools continued throughout the years 2012, 
2013 and 2014. Moreover, the amount of humanitarian aid given to the syrian 
population had increased since 2012, as the syrian civil war worsened and the 
suffering from the syrian population increased. 
 
In 2013 and 2014, the EU gave 350,000,000 euro and 201,000,00 euro respectively 
to various NGO and international organization, whom are doing humanitarian work in 
Syria or other neighboring countries housing Syrian refugees (European Commision: 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, 2013, and 2014). 
Furthermore, the extent of the economic sanction has also increased as the 
violations of humanitarian rights increased, indicating a pervasive engagement of  
the EU . 
 
The first sanction policy was only 15 pages long, without having identified individual 
goods and commodities prohibited from being sold or bought by the individual 
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member states  (European Council, 2011b). This allowed room for interpretation, 
which meant that big companies, whom were depending on selling and buying 
goods/commodities from Syria, could enter a dialogue with its individual member 
state about the interpretation of the sanction policy.    
 
However, as the human right violations continued, the sanction policies increased in 
length and the room for interpretation diminished as the policies started specifying 
which goods and commodities were banned.   
 
This can be seen in 2013 were the economic sanction policy had increased with 12 
pages, where it identifies individual goods prohibited from being exported or 
imported. Furthermore, the individuals, whom asset had been frozen had also 
increased (European Council, 2013). In terms of crisis management, this evolution of 
the sanctions regime, plus the increasing volume of foreign aid to the region 
showcases that the EU council increased the use of its main policy tools over time, 
showing that they believed that the worsening of the crisis was clear, requiring even 
more action. This helps to illustrate how the EU states narrative of a human rights 
intervention increased over time.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
Throughout the history of political cooperation regarding foreign policy in the EU, we 
can see how rules and norms on how to conduct this type of policy has been created 
and have evolved, leading towards the creation of the CFSP as an institution. 
 
However, these norms and values have not only created a set of rules, but also 
constraints on how the EU can act in their foreign policies. In this section, the set of 
restrictions have been exemplified by showing how in the beginning they could not 
even practice foreign policy making as the main focus was the creation of more 
internal coherence. Once they started producing policies, it normally resulted in joint 
positions which could not be coordinated. However with the passage of time the EU 
can now practice crisis management, as there is a set of structures in the CFSP as 
well as objectives and instruments that can be used in order to deal with crises. 
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However, the creation of the CSDP may create more incoherences or overlappings 
of mandates. 
This can be related to the Syrian civil war with its violations of human rights and the 
EU´s crisis management of the conflict. It is particularly interesting to talk about 
conflicts and norms such as human rights, as it shows whether or not member states 
actually adhere to these norms, when it comes to actively create common foreign 
policy. The next chapter will explore how the EU Council has dealt with the Syrian 
crisis. 
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Chapter 5: Human rights, the CFSP, adherence to norms in 
the Syrian crisis 
 
This Chapter aims firstly to introduce the identity of the EU and the institutional 
agents enforcing this identity within the organisation by identifying the rational-legal 
aspects of the EU by the use of Barnett & Finnemore’s (1999) definition. This is done 
in order to establish an understanding of what the CFSP is lacking compared to 
other more integrated EU institutions. Then the project will continue to present the 
norms of the CFSPs crisis management relevant for the Syrian case and define their 
nature by referring to definitions presented by Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) and 
Thomas (2009). The last part of this chapter will then apply the analytical model of 
‘entrapment’ on the CFSP’s crisis management’s decision-making regarding the 
Syrian crisis. 
5.1 EU Integration and Identity from a Constructivist Perspective. 
The EU’s identity can be found in the norms that shapes the behaviour and working 
processes within the EU institutions. These norms, in which many have been 
institutionalised in treaties, represents common goals and shared behaviour for the 
EU member-states; Lisbon (TEU), article 2 explains the fundamental values of the 
European Union:  
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the right of persons belonging to minorities” (Lisbon Treaty 2007, Article 2). 
The rational-legal aspect of the EU, herein meaning the autonomy and interest of the 
EU organisation apart from its member-states, serves as an enforcer of these norms 
working towards the interests of the EU rather than national interests. This part of the 
EU can therefore be said to be a part of the identity creation cycle, where it promotes 
and encourages adherence to the norms embedded in the EU identity upon the 
member states in order for them to integrate their national identity with the EU 
identity in treaties and their behaviour.  
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While the rational-legal power of the EU generally holds no legal commanding power 
over the member-states, this aspect serves more as an informal power and come to 
shows in different ways in different institutionalised settings within the EU. The 
following section will conduct a presentation of a strong rational-legal power of the 
EU, the Commission, in order to clarify the the strong enforcement of an EU identity 
upon the policy areas where the Commission is involved. This is necessary in order 
to establish where the intergovernmental CFSP is lacking behind in its institutional 
settings and it will serve as an argument for why this project has chosen to look at 
norm adherence as the identity enforcer within the CFSP, and in the end analysing 
norm adherence towards the syrian case.     
5.2 The promoting of EU identity 
The rational-legal power of the EU organization has evolved significantly over time in 
continuous steps towards full integration of its member-states. It represents the 
autonomous part of the EU that operates towards a shared EU interest. With each 
treaty establishing common goals and directives for behavior, this aspect of the EU 
has developed into an influential ‘national-interest converger’ with a focus on 
strengthening the EU as a global actor (Yilmaz, 2014). The establishment of the 
Single Market in the 1950’s, the Maastricht treaty’s conceptualization of specific 
goals such as promoting human rights and the Lisbon treaty’s heavy focus on 
increased EU integration has all contributed to increasing the rational-legal aspect of 
the organization, which serves as a tool in promoting the Union’s identity.  
The rational-legal part of the EU is the aspect of the organization which under any 
circumstances, regardless of state representatives interests, will work towards 
achieving a policy outcome in accordance with the norms defining the organization's 
purpose, whether these has become institutionalized in treaties or are unwritten rules 
that frames proper behavior.  
J. Peter Burgess (2002) in his article of EU legitimacy poses the question of the 
process of shaping  the EU identity 
 “Who or what determines the value-conditions from which the treaties and 
directives of the EU are formulated (…)what identity – political ,economic or 
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other – is available to those who formulate the policies and directives of the 
European Union” (Burgess, 2002, p 480).  
While this project do not investigate nor questions the legitimacy of the EU, Burgess’ 
(2002) point of view still contains significant relevance when determining the 
influence of the rational-legal aspect of the European Union and thereby its  ever 
changing identity. As previously mentioned in the theory chapter, the Commission 
holds significant control over expertise in most of the policy areas within the 
European Union. The personnel working in the Commission operates under a state 
representatives, but in an institutional framework that requires transnational 
employment in each Secretariat, all in close cooperation with each other, to secure 
that it is the interests of the Union as opposed to national interests that are promoted 
(Egeberg, 2013, pp 129-142).  The Commission thereby constitutes probably the 
most obvious example of the power of the rational-legal aspect the EU in the sense 
of the influence it has on both providing the material for the member-states’ policy 
negotiations and its responsibility of formulating the outcomes; its extensive research 
on policy subjects are the ‘value-conditions’ on which the policies and treaties forms 
their foundation and it is the treaties and directives, which forms the Union's identity 
which again defines the operational framework for the Commission.    
The EU’s identity can be presented as norms that are the goals of the organization 
and norms that shapes the behavior within the organization. These norms or this 
identity are thereby promoted through the organisations rational-legal forces such as 
the Commission. However, this influence is only possible because of the member-
states, which in the end makes the final decision, were willing to pool their 
sovereignty in certain policy areas. So what about the policy areas where this 
transformation has yet to happen -  the areas where the EU’s strong internal identity 
power is insignificant compared to the member-states identity.  The remainder of this 
chapter will investigate the presence and extent of the EU’s identity based on norm 
adherence, and the conditions its require in the intergovernmental Common Foreign 
Security  Policy’s crisis management, where the member-states has yet to refrain 
their national sovereignty. 
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5.3 CFSP as an intergovernmental institution and its norms 
 
The intergovernmental structure of the CFSP institution has managed to avoid the 
integration processes that the other EU institutions has undergone with each treaty 
implemented. It is still the Council and thereby the member-states that officially 
conducts the strategies of the EU’s foreign policies (Egeberg, 2013 pp 129-142). The 
CFSP, in comparison with other EU policy areas, lacks the presence of legal-rational 
EU actors. These legal-rational actors such as the Commission, takes on the 
agenda-setting and implementing role in most other EU institutions, making sure that 
the EU’s values are taken into consideration and promoted in the policy outcomes. 
However, due to the intergovernmental institutional framework within the CFSP, the 
Commission plays a small role compared to its significant agenda-setting presence 
in the rest of the EU (Ibid, 2013). The only connection the Foreign Affairs Council 
have with the Commission, when discussing foreign policy strategies, is by the 
presence of the High Representative which is the non-voting supervisor of CFSP 
meetings along with being the vice-president of the Commission and leader of the 
External Action Service (EEAS) which makes sure that the strategies are 
implemented (Balfour & Raik, 2013) .  
 
The establishment of the EEAS has involved a directing of staff from the 
Commission to the EEAS regarding external relations such as development, in order 
to achieve better coordination between these two informal actors and the Foreign 
Affairs Council (Ibid, 2013). However, the EEAS has yet to achieve the EU identity 
promoting role alike the Commission’s and it is still mostly seen and used as a 
secretariat for the ministers as opposed to the possible supranational actor that 
some hoped it would be (Ibid, 2013, p 1-11).   
 
While the High Representative in cooperation with the EEAS can try to influence the 
discussions and mediate between the member-states in order to achieve a common 
position, their rational-legal roles are still significantly small in comparison to the 
member-states influence on the various policy areas of the CFSP. 
 
However, despite being intergovernmental, the foreign policy of the EU has still 
impacted the world to some extent, although some critics calls for more action on the 
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area. In 2012 for instance the EU received the Nobel Peace prize for being able to 
export its values of democracy and human rights on both its own member-states 
along with third party countries (Yilmaz, 2014). This indicates that even though the 
presence of rational-legal actors promoting EU identity within the foreign policy area 
is rather small, the underlying norms of this identity, still play a determining role in 
the decision-making process. The question then remains of who or what enforces 
these norms and to what extent is the EU able to act upon such norms.  
 
This project has chosen to examine two significant norms affecting the CFSP´s area 
of crisis management. The choice of examining crisis management was made due to 
the timeframe and urgency within this policy area, which often calls for immediate 
action from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFA’s) with no or little time to determine 
a national standpoint first. The following will firstly determine the nature of the two 
norms; human rights & consensus in decision-making by using the definitions 
presented by Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) and Daniel C. Thomas (2009). After 
establishing the nature of these norms, this project will apply the analysis model by 
Daniel C. Thomas to the EU crisis management in Syria, in order to measure the 
extent that these norms have impacted the decision-making process.  
  
Furthermore, as presented in the theory chapter of this project five types of norms 
are presented and defined; Finnemore’s & Sikkinks ‘regulative’, ‘constitutive’ & 
‘prescriptive’ norms (1998) and Thomas’ ‘means-oriented’ & ‘ends-oriented’ norms 
(2009). Four of these five types of norms will be applied in order to establish the 
nature and impact of the two norms of human rights and consensus driven decision-
making in the CFSP crisis management. 
 
The consensus norm can be categorised as what Finnemore (1998) dubs ‘a 
regulative norm’ and what Thomas (2009) deems a ‘means-oriented norm’. This 
norms can both regulate and constrain the behavior of the MFA’s in their decision-
making in crisis management. The consensus norm frames the negotiation process 
as decisions reached should be achieved through a consensus and thereby it 
regulates the behaviour of the ministers and forces them to compromise in order to 
achieve a common ground. This norm is extremely important in to encourage states 
to compromise their national interests towards a common goal, since if they chose 
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not to, there would probably be little to no collaboration - at least not between 28 
different states.  
 
Therefore the norm of consensus holds significant impact of both enforcing the 
Union’s identity of acting as a united entity as well as leading the decision-makers 
towards a shared decision, where no state can reject their participation in a policy 
afterwards, since all have to agree. 
 
This consensus norm has generally been shaping the decision-making process 
within crisis management, even after the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was 
implemented as an alternative to consensus regarding the implementation of policies 
as stated by the Lisbon Treaty (Anon, 2008, p 41).    
 
The other norm examinated by this project is the norm of human rights. This norm 
represents a ‘constitutive’ norm in Finnemore & Sikkink’s (1998) definition and an 
‘ends-oriented’ norm in Thomas’ (2009) version. While these two types of norms not 
necessarily means the same as it was the case in the ‘means-oriented’ & ‘regulative’ 
norms, in the particular norm of human rights they both describe aspects of the norm 
which are similar.  
Promoting human rights is a constitutive norm in that the European Union has 
established it in its treaties. The European Convention on Human Rights is legally 
binding to the member-states. (Maastricht treaty´s, 1993, Title 1, Article F). The 
Convention states that citizens across Europe has a certain set of rights, despite any 
ethnic and cultural difference such as the right to life, prohibition of torture, freedom 
of speech and so forth (European Court of Human Rights, 1953). 
 
However, these human rights provisions, which member states are bound to when 
conducting domestic policies, are not binding to the CFSP and its member states, 
when they are conducting foreign policy, as the Lisbon treaty (2007) states: “The 
charter does not extend the field of applications of Union law beyond the power of 
the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union” (Lisbon treaty 2007, title 
5, Subsection A1) 
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This means that, the EU is not legally bound by the role of an enforcer of human 
rights outside of its borders. The EU member states are not constrained in their 
external relations by human rights, therefore even when there is gross violations of 
human rights elsewhere, the EU does not have to take action if it does not wishes to, 
as other interests or provisions may be of more interest by the organization.  
 
However this does not mean that the EU does not promote human rights through 
their external relations. Member states of the EU agree to the universality of human 
rights in their own domestic policies, and at the same time the CFSP has a goal of 
promoting human rights as part of their foreign policy objectives as explained in the 
background chapter of this project.  
 
Human rights thereby represents a constitutive norm, which has been 
institutionalised by the EU  in the treaties in terms of domestic politics, and has 
created new interests for related institutions such as the CFSP, while at the same 
time creating new actors, like the High Representative, who needs to push for those 
interests in the CFSP. While at the same time, human rights also serve as the end-
goal for the crisis management policies regarding the Syria crisis, determining the 
type of action the Union should take regarding the crisis in Syria. This can be seen 
by the emphasis on human rights in all EU communications regarding Syria (Council 
of the European union, 2011; 2013; 2014).  
 
The following section will analyse the impact of these norms, in the  decision-making 
within crisis management in order to determine the extent to which these norms may 
have influenced the policy-outcomes and their efficiency in the Syrian crisis.  
 
5.4 The Syrian Crisis, CFSP, and Normative institutionalism. 
 
In this section, the policy-making decisions regarding the Syrian crisis from the 
European Council and Foreign Affair Council  will be analyzed through the lens of 
normative institutionalism and the five factors of entrapment: determinacy, relevance, 
precedent, forum and publicity. It is argued, that in regards to Syria a situation of 
“entrapment” in normative arguments of human rights has happened in the decision-
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making process, which have resulted  in certain foreign policy action. However, over 
time the entrapment has become weaker as the situation in Syria has changed. 
 
The Syrian case spurred with the Arab Spring, this narrative of the Arab spring 
movements is how the EU approached the Syrian situation from the beginning. For 
that reason, once the regime of Al-Assad started the crackdown of the peaceful 
Syrian protesters, the EU sent a clear message against the violation of human rights 
in Syria (Council of the European union, 2011; High Representative Declaration 
,2011). In relation to our theory, the respect of human rights norms of the EU was 
broken, therefore it was clear that there was a determinacy in using human rights in 
order to promote action in Syria against the Assad government by the EU. The 
statement of the High Representative can exemplify this: 
 
 “The EU measures responds to the escalation of the Syrian authorities' 
violent crackdown, including by military means, that has led to the killing, 
injury or arrest of Syrian citizens for their participation in peaceful protests. 
This is clearly inconsistent with the universal principles of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.” (High Representative Declaration, 2011) 
  
For that reason, the first council declaration had a set of objectives: were the first 
objective was to increase pressure in the Assad’s regime, which hopefully would 
lead to the Syrian army  withdrawing from towns, as they were the ones practicing 
the repression, the second objective was the implementation of democratic reforms 
in Syria (Council of the European union, 2014; Portela, 2012). Therefore, in order to 
undermine the regime, the EU set out a number of sanctions. As sanctions had been 
used in other countries during the Arab spring, like Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt 
(European Commission, 2015a). Giving the sanctions to Syria, precedent in regards 
to our theory as this type of policy had been previously used.  
 
At the same time the use of the sanction strategy for the other Arab springs, as a tool 
to combat the repression of human rights gives relevance to it in regards to human 
rights norm, even though the outcomes tend to be mixed. The fact of the matter is 
that the sanctions strategy targeted towards the heads of the state in Egypt, Tunisia 
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and Libya had delivered help to the revolutions, as the leaders could not use the 
state funds against its own peoples (Portela, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the forum was the Foreign Affairs Council,  where sanction 
policies are normally decided, which gives us an indication that this policy tool and 
the emphasis on human rights is seen as legitimate by the Foreign Affair Council. In 
addition, at the beginning of the uprisings in Syria, it is easy to see how the media 
supports was geared towards following this Arab spring narrative, as they seemed to 
be arguing that this uprisings were about bringing democracy to this part of the world 
(Abuzeid, 2011; The Telegraph, 2011), this show how the publicity of the conflict 
could have affected the decision making.  
 
For this reason, sanctions in the beginning were highly targeted towards human 
rights repressors and trying to place the supporting business elite Assad had in Syria 
which benefitted from the regime, against him (European Council, 2011b; 2012a; 
2012b). That is why the sanctions have targeted specific individuals, trying to make 
them realize that being part of the regime would have consequences at the personal 
level, in order to discourage others to keep supporting the regime (Portela, 2012; 
Seeberg, 2015). 
 
With this in mind,  it can be argued that the EU's norm adherence towards human 
rights in the beginning of the conflict is caused by an entrapment in the decision 
making process, as a result of this normative entrapment, the council reaches a 
decision through consensus. Creating a set of sanctions, which are used to 
undermine the regime and its repressive activities. This entrapment can be 
explained, through the five factors of normative institutionalism, determinacy, 
relevance, precedent, forum and publicity. These are present in the decision-making 
process of the EU council in one way or another. 
 
The European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council kept this road of action 
through their narratives and more restrictive sanctions all the way up to the 
beginning of 2013. In addition, it can be said that the effects of these sanctions could 
be seen as being effective to a certain extent, as the financing system related to the 
EU was stopped something that affected the Syrian banks. Furthermore, the Oil 
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embargo was one of the main exports of Syria to the EU was oil, giving the Syrian 
regime less revenue and also debilitating the regime (Seeberg, 2015). 
 
Even though there had been a effect of debilitation, the situation in Syria did not 
change as it did with the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt (Libya is another story 
as there was a NATO intervention). The regime of Assad has survived the 
sanctioning from the EU and the EU’s partners (such as the US, the Arab league and 
Turkey). Mostly because of the high levels of support from other actors such as Iran 
and Russia, which have impeded further sanctioning and intervention from the 
international community (Seeberg, 2015). 
 
At the same time, the developments on the ground in Syria, in terms of the civil war 
escalating into a civil war were radical groups have entered the conflict and where 
territory is now divided by many factions. This has made the effect of sanctions 
decrease, as well as changing the narrative from the Arab spring anti-governmental 
conflict, to a narrative of anti-radicalism or anti-terrorism, which has changed 
entrapment of member states in the normative arguments of human rights, to more 
security arguments. For that reason, it can be seen different factors of normative 
institutionalism, are perceived differently. First of all, publicity has now changed in 
regards to Syria, because Syria is now seen as a radicalized country more than a 
democratic revolution, which has happened to some extent, because of the different 
terrorist attacks in Europe (Johnson, 2015; The Guardian, 2015), this means that 
public attention and hence public pressure has changed. 
 
This has made the use of sanctions to not have relevance and the view of Assad’s 
regime to change in the context of the European Union. Furthermore, this has 
happened to the extent that some voices now say that there could be a negotiated 
peace even with Assad still in power (Nakhoul, 2013; The guardian, 2015; Black 
2015). In terms of relevance, this means that the preoccupation for human rights 
perspectives has changed, as even though the Assad regime is still seen as 
repressive, the terrorist groups now in Syria are a factor of major concern, there the 
relevance of human rights norm has fallen in relation to the decision making process 
in the Council, while security plays a bigger role. This new view can be reflected in 
the use of sanctions, as for example the fact that sanctions against oil (as said above 
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the major export of Syria to the EU) has been eased (Council of the European Union, 
2013; Seeberg, 2015). 
 
This would facilitate the regaining of strength of the Assad regime as, even though 
the oil embargo is supposed to only be lifted to the opposition groups (Council of the 
European Union, 2013) it is difficult sometimes to differentiate between those 
involved in government repression and those suffering it (Seeberg, 2015). This 
means that the use of sanctions has changed, as the security of Europe has come to 
the focus, rather than maintaining the sanctions against the Syrian leaders. Because 
of this, sanctions become relatively ineffective as the Syrian elites can see that 
whatever comes next after the regime could be worse and reaffirms their loyalty to 
the regime (Seeberg, 2015). This gives the sanctions less effect, and hence less 
attention by the Foreign Affair Council and their decision making in the 2013 – 2014 
were the sanctions regime has not remarkably changed, and has even been eased 
to a certain extent (Seeberg, 2015). 
 
We can conclude that the member states of the Council have passed from being 
entrapped in terms of normative arguments of human rights repressions and actively 
acting towards the debilitation of the Assad regime, to the preoccupation on security 
and therefore the entrapment on human rights norms has become one of weak 
entrapment, which then has translated into a lower profile type of policy and decision 
making, such as joint communications (Schimmelfening and Thomas, 2009). 
Therefore it is interesting to see, how adherence to EU norms has actually evolved 
over time, as explained by our theory, once the relevance of the norm entrapping 
decision makers fades away, the policy tool employed becomes less used, leading to 
non-adherence and non-action to this particular norm. But the change of narrative 
produces entrapment in other norms, in this case security, which then are reflected 
in other policy outcomes, in the case of Syria this means less focus in the Syrian 
regime of Assad and more in combatting terrorist organisations like ISIS or Al-Nusra. 
Furthermore, evidence of this can be seen by the establishment of the “Council 
conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the 
ISIL/Da'esh threat” of 2015 (European Council, 2015) , which can already be seen as 
changing the focus of the narrative. 
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5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has presented how the EU legal rational actors, as represented by the 
figure of the EU commission, and more specifically the figure of the High 
Representative of Foreign Affairs, influence the CFSP and what kind of role they play 
in regards to the structure of the CFSP and in regards of the promotion of norms. 
Then, norms have been defined in terms of our theory, the consensus norm has 
been defined as regulative and means oriented norm, while human rights has been 
considered as constitutive and goals oriented. From this initial analysis, we have 
then analysed how the EU member states adhere to human rights norm and whether 
entrapment is present in terms of their decision making in the i case of the Syrian 
crisis. This considerations have lead us to the conclusion, that member states were 
entrapped in terms of adherence to human rights in order to make a decision 
regarding the syrian crisis, but that this entrapment has been weakened over time 
because of the change in narratives about the conflict and the escalation in violence 
that has occurred, which has led to a bigger focus in security. In the next chapter we 
will discuss this analysis in relation to broader academic debates. 
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Chapter 6: The EU as a global actor, NPE, and further 
integration 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss our analysis and place it in broader debates about 
Europe as a global actor, the normative power of Europe and the further integration 
of member states in terms of foreign policy.  
In the prior chapter,  we found that the EU member states in the case of Syria, had 
been entrapped by norms such as joint action and human rights as explained by our 
normative institutionalist theory and its five factors of norm entrapment. However, 
this entrapment, due to the policy tools that the CFSP is actually capable of using, 
has resulted in the creation of sanctions against the Syrian regime, following with the 
narrative of a democratic revolution and the repression from the regime which 
resulted in human rights violations. Furthermore, with the evolution of the conflict, 
this entrapment has been weakened as other norms have taken the center stage 
and entrapped decision makers into focusing towards a security narrative,  hence the 
use of CFSP´s policy tools has become smaller and the focus on the syrian regime 
and its human rights violations has been reduced.  
 
This norm entrapment can be argued as to be the rational-legal aspect of the CFSP 
as an institution. In its structure, the High Representative as both the responsible of 
the EEAS and one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission suggests 
policies or actions to the member states, the representative then through its 
recommendations, plays a big role in entrapping member states in terms of the 
norms and values of the EU, trying to push for a convergence of interests in regards 
to these norms and a European identity. However, in regards to the case of Syria 
and other cases in the MENA region, member states may have very complex  
relationships and ties to countries or organizations involved in the conflicts (Pace, 
2007).  
 
It is quite interesting to see then, how even when member states have a different 
level of interest in the middle east, sometimes they had been able to speak with one 
voice in terms of the conflicts in the middle east. However, in terms of actions, it 
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could be argued that the use of sanctions can be seen as the lowest common policy 
that all member states could align to. 
 
However it can be argued as well, that sanctions is one of the only actions member 
states could take in terms of the capabilities of the CFSP,  as for example the 
CFSP’s budget from 2013 to 2014 has been reduced from 406 million € to 314 
million € (European Commission, 2015b) and over the period from 2007 to 2013 the 
CFSP’s budget has been of 1981 million € (Terpan, 2014). At the same time, some 
authors argue that since the unfolding of the European crisis, attention to external 
relations by members have decreased and more attention is focused in domestic 
economic affairs (Irmie, 2014; Longdi & Youjin, 2013). Furthermore, it can be seen 
that this lack of capabilities and attention in CFSP may lead to member states relying 
on sanctions as other policy tools are not included in the CFSP budget, and should 
then imply an extra economic contribution by the member states to the conduction of 
foreign policy in the EU ( both by the use of EU instruments, such as the instrument 
for stability (IfS) or by members pooling money from their national budgets) (Terpan, 
2014). 
 
This makes the EU a very specific type of global actor, first of all even though they 
comply with the UN charter and have verbally accepted some of the UN norms such 
as Responsibility to Protect (R2P), compliance with the norm of responsibility to 
protect has not been significant (Franco et.al,  2015). Even without this compliance 
to R2P, the EU is still seen in the international society as an exporter of international 
norms (Pace, 2007; Irmie, 2014; Koehler, 2010). This could be valued highly by the 
UN since with the current structure of the UN security council (UNSC), a 
disagreement between the countries who sit in the council mean that the UN cannot 
act, as can be seen by the conflict in Syria where the UN has been in deadlock, 
because of Russia and its interests in the region. So when the UN cannot reach 
agreement, the EU is seen as the promoter of international norms and the one to 
take the lead in peaceful conflict resolution. However, the structure of the EU and 
their lack of certain capabilities might not give chances to extensive ground 
intervention in a conflict area (Irmie, 2014).  
 
50 
Even though the actual capabilities of the CFSP are relatively small and the 
budgetary issues create disagreement within member states on how to take action, 
this disagreement is particularly detrimental in the CFSP, where member states still 
control the functioning of the CFSP by unanimity (Irmie, 2014). However, the idea of 
the EU as a normative power can be seen as pushed forward by member states 
through the use of some policies and the use of discursive practices (Pace, 2007). 
As Pace (2007) argues, the promotion of norms from the EU in terms of its 
discursive practices are perceived as being ideas that try to be exported to conflict 
areas and be adhered by actors in such areas, which construct the Normative Power 
Europe as coined by Manners (2002, 2006).  Therefore, we can term the EU as a 
normative power, because of their external communication shows this promotion of 
human rights and other norms.  
 
However, due to different complications in the structure and the capabilities of the 
CFSP, even when member states adhere to these norms, this does not convert itself 
into large amounts of action. This could be solved with a new renewed emphasis on 
external actions by the EU, a bigger expansion of the EEAS and maybe even 
conversion of the EU as a military power, which could than more effectively try to 
promote the respect for universal norms such as human rights. 
 
However, this conversion of Europe from a normative power to a military power 
could hinder the EU’s capabilities to export their norms or live by the example of 
them. As of right now, Pace (2007) argues that there is norms like peace and 
dialogue and human rights that also constrain the way the EU deals with its foreign 
policy. As interviews with EU officials states, when conflicts escalate into violence, 
sometimes the EU decides not to act, because entering a conflict militarily as EU and 
not as member states would go against the normative power of the EU (Interviews 
with EU officials in Pace, 2007, p 15). This can be exemplified with the recent 
entrance of France into the coalition, that are bombing ISIS in Syria (Doherty, 2015), 
as France and not as EU, even though it did requested its European neighbours to 
act next to them (Kanter, 2015), which are reflecting how the EU may actually be 
pushing towards more integration of its external relations. Even when acting as a 
sovereign state in military action, this communication of assistance and cooperation 
to and by other member states also exists. This means that even when national 
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interests drives policy, normative considerations in regards to the EU identity are 
made. 
 
Showcasing how even if the CFSP remains intergovernmental, which allows  realists 
scholars to explain the institution as only being driven by national interests, it  could 
still be argued that the CFSP is actual something more than an intergovernmental 
institution as the identity and norms of the EU are showcased in the institution and 
play a role in the decision-making of the member states, sometimes even more that 
national interests. 
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Chapter 7: Project Conclusion 
 
This project has set out to answer the question: “How does adherence to human 
rights and joint action norms impact the decision-making in the CFSP’s crisis 
management and what influence does this have on the EU's aim of further 
integration of its member states?” In order to do so, the project has provided a 
historical context, giving the reader a description of the CFSP as a social construct, 
which has evolved from the increasing cooperation and communication within  
European member states, towards an actual set of common objectives and common 
positions in regards to foreign policy. This project has then moved on to analysing 
the aspects of the EU that functions as a legal-rational actor promoting norms and 
the EU identity. In normal cases this actor would be the european commission, but in 
the case of foreign policy, it would be the High Representative of foreign affairs, who 
at the same time has no actual voting power. Furthermore,  this project has shown to 
what extent different actors influence the CFSP institution through its structure and 
its decision making processes. And In the end of our analysis, we have identified the 
norms of human rights and  the consensus norm as two norms that are present (and 
in the case of human rights also promoted) in the CFSP institution. In addition, we 
have showed how human rights norms entrapped EU member states to conduct 
certain policies in times of crisis management, which has lead to  these norms being 
reflected on their policies and communication towards the current civil war in Syria, 
where gross human rights violations are happening. In doing so, we have found that 
indeed entrapment (as explained by Thomas’ (2009) theory of normative 
institutionalism) has happened, but with the evolution of the conflict in Syria, there 
has been a change in the narrative of the crisis, weakening the  norm entrapment in 
regards to human rights and creating entrapment in other norms, such as security. 
Therefore, it can be said that adherence to certain norms has created action or 
inaction in the CFSP as an institution, by influencing the decision-making process in 
it. Furthermore, in regards to crisis management, not only it is important that member 
states are entrapped in terms of their decision making, in order for the council to be 
able to propose and decide in common actions, but some focus needs to be put in 
the actual capabilities of the CFSP as an institution. The scope of the project finishes 
here, as the decision making process in the CFSP has been the main focus. 
53 
However, further research options would be the possibility of studying the 
relationship between the CFSP and the CSDP in regards to crisis management, and 
also in regards to the capabilities both institutions have, as the EU tries to pool more 
and more together it’s member states external actions and their capabilities.  
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